Robert E. Wilcox, Utah Insurance Commissioner, as Liquidator of Southern American Insurance Company v. CSX Corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Robert E. Wilcox, Utah Insurance Commissioner,
as Liquidator of Southern American Insurance
Company v. CSX Corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. Scott Savage; Samuel O. Gaufin; Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic, Savage & Campbell.
Douglas M. Monson; Brent D. Wride; Elaine A. Monson; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Wilcox v. CSX Corporation, No. 20010411 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3315
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBERT E. WILCOX, Utah Insurance 
Commissioner, as Liquidator of Southern 
American Insurance Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
V . 
CSX Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 20010411 
Priority No. 15 
Brief of Appellant 
Appeal from Judgment Entered by 
The Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki 
E. Scott Savage 
Samuel O. Gaufm 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, 
SAVAGE & CAMPBELL 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Douglas M. Monson 
Brent D.Wride 
Elaine A. Monson 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
F I L E D 
NOV 2 6 2001 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
I t«P A l t 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBERT E. WILCOX, Utah Insurance 
Commissioner, as Liquidator of Southern 
American Insurance Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
V . 
CSX Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 20010411 
Priority No. 15 
Brief of Appellant 
Appeal from Judgment Entered by 
The Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki 
E. Scott Savage 
Samuel O. Gaufin 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, 
SAVAGE & CAMPBELL 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Douglas M. Monson 
Brent D. Wride 
Elaine A. Monson 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Attorneys for Plaintiff?Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 2 
Statement of Facts 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CSX 
SATISFIED THE ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH THE NEW AND 
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSIDERATION DEFENSE 8 
II. THE NEW AND CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSIDERATION 
DEFENSE IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT CONTEMPORANEOUS 
TRANSFERS AND NOT TRANSFERS MADE TO PAY 
ANTECEDENT DEBTS 10 
III. CSX PROVIDED NEITHER NEW NOR CONTEMPORANEOUS 
CONSIDERATION TO SAIC IN EXCHANGE FOR THE 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED 12 
A. No "New" Consideration Was Provided to SAIC by CSX 12 
1. CSX's Agreement to Forbear from Pursuing SAIC to 
Judgment by Settling the Cases Did Not Constitute 
New Consideration 12 
2. CSX's Execution of a Release of "Future" Claims 
Against SAIC Did Not Constitute New Consideration 14 
3. No Goods, Services, or Money Was Provided to SAIC 
by CSX that Would Constitute New Consideration 16 
ii 
B. No Contemporaneous Consideration was Provided by CSX to 
SAIC 16 
1. The Payments Made by SAIC to CSX Were to Satisfy 
Antecedent Debts and Thus Could Not Have 
Constituted Contemporaneous Consideration 17 
2. CSX's Agreement to Release SAIC From Liability For 
All Claims Arising Under the Insurance Policy Was 
Not Contemporaneously Made In Exchange for the 
Payments CSX Received from SAIC 20 
IV. FINALLY, CSX SHOULD NOT HAVE PREVAILED ON ITS 
NEW AND CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSIDERATION 
DEFENSE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO OFFER ANY EVIDENCE 
THAT ALLOCATES ANY MONETARY VALUE TO THE 
FUTURE CLAIMS THAT WERE RELEASED 23 
CONCLUSION 24 
ADDENDUM 26 
i i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bavely v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 36 B.R. 582, 584 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) 14 
Bowler v. Deseret Village Ass'n, 922 P.2d 8 (Utah 1996) 1 
Buggage v. Yellow Checker Cab Co., 623 So.2d 906, 907 (La. Ct. App. 1993) 17 
Drabkin v. A.I. Credit Corp., 800 F.2d 1153, 1158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 13 
In re Aero-Fastener, Inc., 177 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) 13, 23 
In re Air Conditioning. Inc. of Stuart, 845 F.2d 293, 298 (11th Cir. 1988) 13 
In re Barefoot, 952 F.2d 795 (4th Cir. 1991) 21 
In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 832F.2d997, 1001 (7th Cir. 1987) 15, 17,20 
In re Futoran, 76 F.3d 265,266-67 (9th Cir. 1996) 20 
In re Hudson Valley Quality Meats, Inc.. 29 B.R. 67, 72 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982) 20 
In re Jet Floridav System, Inc., 841 F.2d 1082 13 
In re Lario, 36 B.R. 582, 584 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) 13 
In re Miniscribe Corp., 123 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) 20 
In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 80 B.R. 517 13 
In re Ogden. 243 B.R. 104, 111-112 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) 20 
In re Olson, 66 B.R. 687 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) 20 
In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc., 55 B.R. 371, 376 (N.D. 111. 1985) 11, 12,22 
In re Pan Trading Corporation. S.A..125 B.R. 869 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) 16, 21 
In re Southern American Insurance Co., Case No. 920901617 3 
In re Thomas McKinnon Securities Inc., 125 B.R. 94, 97-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1991) 13 
iv 
In re Upstairs Gallery, Inc., 167 B.R. 915, 918 (9th Cir. BAP 1993) 17 
In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1986) 20 
In re Winkle, 128 B.R. 529, 536 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) 19 
Matter of Duffy, 3. B.R. 263, 265-66 (Bankr. S.D.N. Y. 1980) 14 
Pine Top Ins. v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav., 969 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 
1992) 11 
Van Huffel Tube Corp. v. A & G Indus., 74 B.R. 579, 587 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1987) 14 
Statutes 
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321 1, 2,4, 5, 6, 7 
Utah Code Annotated § 31-1-301(21) (1999) 16 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-1-301 (24) (1999) 16 
Other Authorities 
5 Collier on Bankruptcy § 547.04[l][a] at p. 547-44 (15th Ed. 2001) 11,23 
v 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2-2(3)0) (1996). 
ISSUES 
I. Did the district court err in determining that there was new and 
contemporaneous consideration given for payments made by Southern American 
Insurance Company ("SAIC") to CSX Corporation ("CSX") prior to the liquidation of 
SAIC?1 
Standard of Review: Because the district court decided the issue on summary 
judgment, the standard of review is de novo. Bowler v. Deseret Village Ass'n, 922 P.2d 
8 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
This case is governed by Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-27-321, which 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(l)(a) As used in this chapter, "preference" means a transfer of any 
of the property of an insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on 
account of an antecedent debt, made or allowed by the insurer within one 
year before the filing of a successful petition for rehabilitation or 
liquidation under this chapter, the effect of which transfer may enable the 
creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than another creditor of 
the same class would receive.... 
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the rehabilitator or 
liquidator, if: 
(i) the insurer was insolvent at the time of the transfer; [or] 
(ii) the transfer was made within four months before the filing 
of the petition; 
This issue was raised below in cross-motions for summary judgment. (R. 615-628.) 
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(4) The receiver may not avoid a transfer of property under this 
section for or because of: 
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings, 
In 1992, the Third Judicial District Court placed SAIC into liquidation and 
appointed the Utah Insurance Commissioner as Liquidator. In 1994, the Liquidator filed 
suit against CSX pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321. This statute allows the 
Liquidator to recover certain preferential payments made to creditors prior to liquidation 
so that funds can be brought back into the estate and equitably distributed to all creditors 
in accordance with the Utah Insurance Code's statutory priority scheme. In this instance, 
the Liquidator's action sought to recover, for the benefit of SAICs creditors and 
policyholders, three payments totaling $308,000 that were made by SAIC to CSX prior to 
liquidation. 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the district court. On 
April 3, 2001, the district court denied the Liquidator's motion for summary judgment 
and granted CSX's motion for summary judgment. The district court ruled that CSX had 
provided SAIC with new and contemporaneous consideration for the payments that SAIC 
made to CSX, thereby providing CSX with a defense to the Liquidator's action under 
Utah Code Annotated § 31 A-27-321. This is an appeal from the final judgment entered 
by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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Statement of Facts, 
1. SAIC was a Utah insurance company that was placed into liquidation by 
the Third Judicial District Court (the "Liquidation Court") on March 25, 1992, in the case 
of in In re Southern American Insurance Co., Case No. 920901617, on March 26, 1992. 
(R. 311, 312.) 
2. As part of its insurance business, SAIC issued three excess insurance 
policies to CSX or its predecessors covering various liabilities and occurrences. (R. 312, 
313, 322-330, 369-379, 380-388.) 
3. These three policies insured CSX and/or its predecessors for occurrences 
between July 14, 1979, and July 31, 1982. (Id) 
4. On or about October 3, 1985, the predecessors of CSX filed two separate 
complaints against SAIC based on the SAIC insurance policies. (R. 314, 315, 389-399, 
400-443.) 
5. Also on or about January 11, 1990, the predecessor of CSX filed a third 
complaint against SAIC based on the SAIC insurance policies. (R. 315, 316, 444-465.) 
6. The three lawsuits identified in the preceding paragraphs are collectively 
referred to below as the "asbestos coverage litigation." 
7. In or about March of 1991, SAIC and CSX commenced settlement 
negotiations for the asbestos coverage litigation, which continued over the next several 
months. (R. 316, 466-467.) 
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8. On or about October 14, 1991, a settlement letter (the "October 14, 1991 
Settlement Letter") was circulated memorializing the settlement terms to which SAIC 
and CSX had agreed. (R. 317,470-472.) 
9. The October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter was executed by CSX on October 
17, 1991 and by SAIC on October 25, 1991. (R. 317,470-472.) 
10. As memorialized in the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter, SAIC agreed 
to pay $308,000 in three virtually equal monthly installments commencing on October 
31, 1991 and ending on December 31, 1991. (R. 317,470-472.) 
11. SAIC made the following payments to CSX which were drawn on a 
checking account SAIC maintained at Zions First National Bank: 
Check No. Check Amount Check Date 
035353 $102,667 October 28, 1991 
035437 $102,667 November 26, 1991 
035483 $102,666 January 2, 1992 
These checks represent the subject matter of the present action. (R. 318, 512-514.) 
12. After receipt of the checks, they were endorsed and cleared SAIC's 
checking account at Zions First National Bank on November 13, 1991, December 6, 1991 
and January 16, 1992, respectively. (R. 318, 512-514.) 
13. The Liquidator of SAIC caused the Complaint commencing this action to 
be filed on March 25, 1994, requesting that the $308,000 in payments be avoided as 
preferential transfers pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 31A-27-321. (R. 318, 516-
521.) 
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14. On February 2, 2000, CSX filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
ground, inter alia, that the Liquidator's preference claim was barred by the new and 
contemporaneous consideration defense. (R. 188-272.) 
15. On March 30, 2000, the Liquidator filed a cross motion for summary 
judgment and for partial summary against CSX on the grounds that the elements of a 
preferential transfer existed under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321, and that CSX had not 
established any defenses to the preferential action. (R. 273-309.) 
16. On March 5, 2001, the District Court heard oral argument on the cross 
motions for summary judgment and on March 12, 2001, it entered a memorandum 
decision pursuant to which it granted CSX's motion for summary judgment and denied 
the Liquidator's motion for summary judgment and for partial summary judgment. (R. 
615-628.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court erred in holding that CSX satisfied the elements to 
establish the "new and contemporaneous consideration" defense to the Liquidator's 
preference action. The statute requires that to establish the new and contemporaneous 
consideration defense, more than mere legal consideration must be given. The 
consideration must be new and contemporaneous. 
II. The purpose of the "new and contemporaneous consideration" defense is to 
protect contemporaneous transfers, not transfers that are on account of antecedent debts. 
Thus, the defense comes into play only when a creditor has given new value as a fair 
exchange that has caused no diminution or depletion to the subsequent insolvent estate 
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that would be detrimental to other creditors. 
III. The District Court erred as a matter of law in applying the new and 
contemporaneous consideration defense in this case. The policy behind the new and 
contemporaneous defense is to allow companies to acquire goods and services even 
though they may be close to liquidation. When a company acquires something "new" in 
terms of goods or services, the estate is not diminished and Ihe policies of the preference 
statute are not implicated. However, in this case CSX did not provide any "new" value to 
SAIC and the payments that were made to CSX reduced the amount of assets available to 
pay SAIC's creditors and policyholders. 
CSX contended in the District Court that its forbearance from prosecuting a valid 
claim and its a promise to forego future litigation which could have resulted in a 
judgment constituted "new consideration" to SAIC. However, this argument has been 
advanced by numerous other preference defendants and soundly rejected by the federal 
courts. CSX's right to assert insurance claims against SAIC was a part of the bargain 
struck when CSX paid its insurance premiums and SAIC agreed to provide insurance 
coverage for the period between July 14, 1979 to July 31, 1982. By forbearing from 
suing on its claims under the insurance policies, (whether for past, present or future 
claims), CSX was merely exercising a pre-existing right, not giving "new" consideration 
to SAIC. 
In addition, there could be no "future" claims because the coverage period ended 
in 1982 and no later insurance policies were ever provided to CSX by SAIC. Indeed, 
prior to the time that the three transfers at issue in this case were made, CSX had actually 
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filed three separate lawsuits to enforce its prior demands. In each of those lawsuits, CSX 
sued SAIC to recover damages resulting from all claims that existed under the insurance 
policies. There would be no liability for "future" exposures because SAIC did not insure 
CSX for any period after 1982. 
Furthermore, the argument that a release constitutes new value, whether it covers 
past, present, or future claims, has repeatedly been rejected by the courts for important 
policy reasons. If a release resulting from settling a claim was new value, creditors 
would rush to settle for cash at the first hint of a debtor's financial trouble. Those 
creditors who successfully settle would likely receive more than they otherwise would 
have. 
Finally, in this case, CSX gave nothing that constituted new consideration to SAIC 
to offset the clear depletion of SAIC s assets from SAIC's settlement payments totaling 
$308,000 to CSX. CSX did not provide new goods or services to SAIC nor did it 
otherwise add to SAIC's assets. 
In addition to the fact that there was no "new" consideration, the consideration 
paid by CSX was not "contemporaneous." The mere fact that CSX's claim was 
compromised does not affect the time when the debt first arose and was owed by SAIC. 
Rather, the later settlement was inextricably tied to and related back to the earlier claims 
that arose during the insurance coverage period of 1979 to 1982 and did not give rise to 
any new "debt." At the very least, CSX's claims and SAIC's corresponding debt arose 
when the last complaint in the asbestos coverage litigation was filed against SAIC in 
January of 1990. 
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Moreover, even assuming that the settlement agreement was somehow 
"contemporaneous" with SAIC's liabilities, the settlement payments themselves were not 
made contemporaneously with the settlement agreement. Thus, the District Court erred 
as a matter of law. 
IV. Finally, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment summary 
judgment in favor of CSX because CSX did not offer any evidence that allocated any 
monetary value to SAIC from a release of future claims or that distinguished between the 
consideration for a release of future claims and the release of past and present claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CSX SATISFIED 
THE ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH THE NEW AND 
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSIDERATION DEFENSE. 
The purpose of the preference provisions in the Utah Insurance Code is to treat all 
similarly situated creditors of an insolvent insurance the same. The legislature 
recognized that sometimes when insurance companies are on the verge of liquidation, 
certain creditors may be preferred and receive payment from the insolvent insurance 
company. Whether such preferences are intentional or not, the legislature has determined 
that such payments should be brought back into the estate and that the assets of the estate 
should be divided equally among all similarly situated creditors. The legislature, 
however, provided an exception for cases in which a party provides an insurance 
company with new and contemporaneous consideration for a payment. In such cases, the 
value of the estate is not diminished and the transaction is therefore not voidable. 
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In this case, the District Court granted CSX's motion for summary judgment based 
upon the application of the new and contemporaneous consideration defense set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4). The court stated in pertinent part in its memorandum 
decision as follows: 
In the instant case, it is undisputed the Settlement Agreement 
between SAIC and CSX released CSX's existing and future claims. This, 
in addition [to] the consideration noted by CSX in their memorandum in 
support of their motion, leads to the conclusion the payments received by 
CSX were for new and contemporaneous consideration. Accordingly, as a 
matter of law, the Liquidator's ability to avoid the payments is foreclosed 
and summary judgment in favor of CSX is appropriate. 
(R.623.) 
Two reasons are identified by the District Court to support its conclusion that the 
new and contemporaneous consideration defense applied to bar the Liquidator's claims 
against CSX. First, the District Court was persuaded that CSX's release of "future" 
claims against SAIC in the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter constituted new and 
contemporaneous consideration. Second, the District Court was persuaded that because 
CSX had foregone its right to (1) obtain a judgment against SAIC, (2) appeal any errors 
that occurred at trial, and (3) execute on that judgment and save the expenses of litigation 
by entering into the settlement agreement, this also constituted new and contemporaneous 
consideration. 
As explained below, the District Court erred as a matter of law in determining that 
CSX gave new and contemporaneous consideration to SAIC in exchange for the 
$308,000 in payments it received. The Utah statute at issue requires that to establish the 
new and contemporaneous consideration defense, more than mere legal consideration 
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must be given.2 In other words, to come within the scope of the defense, CSX had to 
establish that in exchange for the payments it received, it gave "a new and 
contemporaneous consideration" to SAIC under Utah Code Annotated § 31A-27-
321(4)(a). As a matter of law, neither CSX's willingness to forbear pursuing its claims 
against SAIC to judgment, nor its release of SAIC's pre-existing liability to CSX, 
whether relating to past, present, or future claims under its insurance policies with SAIC, 
constituted new consideration or contemporaneous consideration under Utah's statute. 
Therefore, the District Court's decision must be reversed and this case remanded to the 
District Court so that partial summary judgment can be entered in favor of the 
Liquidator.3 
II. THE NEW AND CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSIDERATION DEFENSE IS 
DESIGNED TO PROTECT CONTEMPORANEOUS TRANSFERS AND 
NOT TRANSFERS MADE TO PAY ANTECEDENT DEBTS 
The Liquidator is not aware of any Utah cases construing the new and 
contemporaneous consideration defense set forth in Utah's Insurance Code. However, 
this defense is comparable to the federal Bankruptcy Code's "contemporaneous exchange 
for new value" defense to a bankruptcy preference action under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1). 
The policy underlying the preference doctrine is "to prevent creditors from obtaining 
2
 The case cited by the District Court in support of its decision establishes merely that a 
release can constitute legal consideration. However, the question in this case is not 
whether the settlement agreement was supported by adequate consideration. Rather, the 
question is whether the consideration that was given was "new" and "contemporaneous." 
3
 Summary judgment in favor of the Liquidator would be partial because the District 
Court would still need to rule on the question of whether SAIC was insolvent at the time 
of the payments to CSX. 
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satisfaction of their claims on the eve of liquidation to the detriment of other similarly 
situated creditors." Pine Top Ins. v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav., 969 F.2d 321, 
324 (7th Cir. 1992). Because the policy underlying the preference doctrine under state 
insurance liquidation law is the same as that under federal bankruptcy law, "it is 
customary to look to federal bankruptcy law for guidance" when a voidable preference 
dispute exists in a state insurance liquidation case. Pine Top Ins. v. Bank of America 
Nat. Trust & Sav., 969 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1992). 
The "contemporaneous exchange for new value" defense comes into play when a 
creditor has given new value as a fair exchange that has caused no diminution or 
depletion to the subsequent bankruptcy estate that would be detrimental to other 
creditors. In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc., 55 B.R. 371, 376 (N.D. 111. 1985). One of the 
leading treatises on bankruptcy law explains that this defense was meant to protect 
exchanges of property that might otherwise be considered credit transactions when the 
transactions were actually contemporaneous transfers. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy § 
547.04[l][a] at p. 547-44 (15th Ed. 2001). Collier cites the legislative history underlying 
this defense which states as follows: 
The [contemporaneous exchange] exception is a simple one, 
excepting a transfer that is really not on account of an antecedent debt... 
No doubt a purchase by the debtor of goods or services with a check, if 
deemed to be on credit by state law, would be insulated by this exception. 
Though strictly speaking the transaction may be a credit transaction 
because the seller does not receive payment until the check is cleared 
through the debtor's bank, it is generally considered and intended to be a 
contemporaneous transaction, and assuming the check is promptly 
deposited and cleared, is in fact substantially contemporaneous. [Citation 
omitted]. 
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Id. at p. 547-44 n.7. 
III. CSX PROVIDED NEITHER NEW NOR CONTEMPORANEOUS 
CONSIDERATION TO SAIC IN EXCHANGE FOR THE PAYMENTS 
RECEIVED 
The policy behind the new and contemporaneous defense is to allow companies to 
acquire goods and services even though they may be close to liquidation. When a 
company acquires something "new" in terms of goods or sendees, the estate is not 
diminished and the policies of the preference statute are not implicated. However, in this 
case, as shown below, CSX did not provide any "new" value to SAIC and the payments 
that were made to CSX reduced the amount of assets available to pay SAIC's creditors 
and policyholders. Further, as also shown below, the consideration provided by CSX was 
not contemporaneous, and the District Court therefore erred in granting CSX's motion for 
summary judgment. 
A. No "New" Consideration Was Provided to SAIC by CSX. 
1. CSX's Agreement to Forbear from Pursuing SAIC to Judgment by 
Settling the Cases Did Not Constitute New Consideration. 
CSX contended in the District Court that its forbearance from prosecuting a valid 
claim and its a promise to forego future litigation which could have resulted in a 
judgment constituted "new consideration" to SAIC. (R. 534-537.) However, this 
argument has been advanced by numerous other preference defendants and soundly 
rejected by the federal courts. For example, in In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc., 55 B.R. 371 
(N.D. 111. 1985), the court held that the creditor's forbearance from obtaining an 
immediate judgment against the debtor did not enhance the debtor's estate and was not 
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"new value" to the debtor's estate. The Ottawa Cartage court compared this forbearance 
argument to the forbearance argument in an earlier Ohio bankruptcy decision, where the 
Ohio bankruptcy court rejected the notion that a creditor's forbearance from exercising its 
rights under a lease were "new value" to the debtor: 
First, [creditor] gave nothing "new" to the debtor. [Creditor's] right to 
evict or not to evict upon default by [debtor] was a part of the bargain 
struck when the lease was executed. By forbearing from evicting [debtor], 
[creditor] was merely exercising a pre-existing right, not giving "new 
value." 
Id. at 376, quoting. In re Lario, 36 B.R. 582, 584 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). 
Similarly, in In re Aero-Fastener, Inc., 177 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994), a 
supplier of aircraft parts to a bankrupt debtor was sued for pre-petition preferential 
payments made to the supplier. The supplier had sued the debtor pre-petition to recover 
payments for earlier shipments to the debtor, and sought to attach the debtor's assets. 
The parties settled the lawsuit, and as part of the settlement, the debtor shipped goods 
back to the supplier. When the supplier was later sued for the value of the shipped goods 
as a preference, the supplier argued that it gave new value to the debtor by agreeing to 
forbear from pursuing its attachment motion against the debtor. The bankruptcy court 
rejected this argument, concluding that the forbearance of asserting legal rights does not 
constitute "new" value to a debtor. Id, at 138-39, citing In re Air Conditioning, Inc. of 
Stuart, 845 F.2d 293, 298 (11th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 993, 109 S.Ct. 557 
(1988); In re Jet Floridav System, Inc., 841 F.2d 1082, Drabkin v. A.L Credit Corp., 800 
F.2d 1153, 1158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re Thomas McKinnon Securities Inc., 125 B.R. 
94, 97-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 80 B.R. 517; Matter of 
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Installation Services, Inc., 101 B.R. 282, 285 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989; Van Huffel Tube 
Corp. v. A & G Indus.. 74 B.R. 579, 587 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); Bavely v. Merchants 
Naf IBank, 36 B.R. 582, 584 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); Matter of Duffy, 3. B.R. 263, 
265-66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
Likewise in this case, CSX's right to assert insurance claims against SAIC was a 
part of the bargain struck when CSX paid its insurance premiums and SAIC agreed to 
provide insurance coverage for the period between July 14, 1979 to July 31, 1982. By 
forbearing from suing on its claims under the insurance policies, (whether for past, 
present or future claims), CSX was merely exercising a pre-existing right, not giving 
"new" consideration to SAIC. 
2. CSX's Execution of a Release of "Future" Claims Against 
SAIC Did Not Constitute New Consideration. 
The District Court concluded that the "new and contemporaneous consideration" 
defense applied because CSX released SAIC from "future" claims in the October 14, 
1991 Settlement Letter. (R. 623.) However, as a matter of law, there could be no 
"future" claims because the coverage period ended in 1982 and no later insurance 
policies were ever provided to CSX by SAIC. Indeed, prior to the time that the three 
transfers at issue in this case were made, CSX had actually filed three separate asbestos 
coverage litigation lawsuits to enforce its prior demands. In each of those lawsuits, CSX 
sued SAIC to recover damages resulting from all claims that existed under the insurance 
policies and CSX acknowledged in each of the lawsuits that it "anticipated additional 
asbestos related bodily injury lawsuits may be filed" against it. (R. 391, 404, 447.) The 
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exact amount of damages may not have been known by CSX at the time it filed the 
lawsuits, but according to its CSX's own allegations, SAIC's liability had already 
attached. In other words, CSX alleged that during the period from 1979 to 1982 there 
had been exposure to asbestos and that this rendered SAIC liable. There would be no 
liability for "future" exposures because SAIC did not insure CSX for any period after 
1982. 
Furthermore, the argument that a release constitutes new value, whether it covers 
past, present, or future claims, has repeatedly been rejected by the courts and for good 
reason. As explained in In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 832 F.2d 997, 1003 (7 Cir. 
1987): 
If a release (and possible "goodwill") resulting from settling a claim was new 
value bringing the settlement payment within the contemporaneous exchange 
exception, creditors would rush to settle for cash at the first hint of the debtor's 
financial trouble rather than wait and pursue a claim in bankruptcy. Those 
creditors who successfully settle will likely receive more than they otherwise 
would have, leaving less for the creditors who do not successfully settle. This 
would be inconsistent with Congress' intent to deter creditors from dismembering 
the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy and to promote equity among creditors. 
[Citation omitted]. Congress certainly did not intend the contemporaneous 
exchange exception to achieve such a result. 
Likewise in this case, if the application of the new and contemporaneous 
consideration defense is upheld, one of the vital purposes behind Utah's insurance 
liquidation statute will be frustrated, i.e. to treat similarly situated creditors equally and to 
discourage creditors from "dismembering" an insolvent insurance company. 
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3. No Goods, Services, or Money Was Provided to SAIC by CSX that 
Would Constitute New Consideration. 
"The well-accepted purpose of the 'contemporaneous exchange for new value 
exception to the preference rules is to enable a debtor to procure necessary goods and 
services during the precarious period before the debtor files bankruptcy". In re Pan 
Trading Corporation, S.A., 125 B.R. 869 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). In this case, CSX 
gave nothing that constituted new consideration to SAIC to offset the clear depletion of 
SAIC's assets from SAIC's settlement payments totaling $308,000 to CSX. CSX did not 
provide new goods or services to SAIC nor did it otherwise add to SAIC's assets. CSX 
also did not pay any additional premiums to SAIC in 1991 in return for new insurance 
coverage. CSX only received what it had previously bargained for, Le., payment on pre-
existing covered insurance claims. CSX's rights against SAIC for insurance coverage 
and insurance payments (whether for past, present, or future claims) arose because CSX 
and its predecessors had paid SAIC insurance premiums many years ago in return for 
SAIC's agreement to provide insurance coverage for any claims arising during the 
coverage period. CSX did not give SAIC any "new consideration" just because it agreed 
to settle with SAIC long after the coverage period had passed. SAIC already had the 
obligation to provide insurance coverage to CSX during the coverage period. 
B. No Contemporaneous Consideration was Provided by CSX to SAIC. 
As established above, while there may have been "legal" consideration for the 
settlement agreement between SAIC and CSX, this consideration was not "new." In 
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addition, for the reasons set forth below, the consideration provided by CSX was also not 
contemporaneous, as required by the statute. 
1. The Payments Made by SAIC to CSX Were to Satisfy Antecedent 
Debts and Thus Could Not Have Constituted Contemporaneous 
Consideration. 
The public policy behind the new and contemporaneous consideration defense is 
"to protect 'transfers that [are] not really on account of an antecedent debt.9 In re Energy 
Cooperative, Inc., 832 F.2d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the defense does not 
fit in this case because the payments made by SAIC to CSX were clearly on account of 
an antecedent debt. In other words, SAIC and CSX were not engaging in a 
contemporaneous transaction but were settling a pre-existing business obligation. The 
mere fact that CSX's claim was compromised does not affect the time when the debt first 
arose and was owed by SAIC. See In re Upstairs Gallery, Inc., 167 B.R. 915, 918 (9th 
Cir. BAP 1993). Rather, the later settlement was inextricably tied to and related back to 
the earlier claims that arose during the insurance coverage period of 1979 to 1982 and did 
not give rise to any new "debt." See ^ g. Buggage v. Yellow Checker Cab Co., 623 So.2d 
906, 907 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (.. ."a settlement is merely the method in which a claim is 
negotiated and satisfied by the parties prior to trial. The fact that a claim is agreed to 
immediately by the insurer, or negotiated over a period of time, does not negate the fact 
that the claim arose out of the insurance policy and is therefore a 'covered claim' "). 
In this case, CSX's claims and SAIC's corresponding debt arose by the end of the 
coverage periods under the insurance policies issued by SAIC. The unambiguous 
language of the insurance policies provides that SAIC was liable for excess railroad 
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liability and auto liability, personal injury, property damage, employers liability (FELA), 
workers compensation and occupational diseases for three separate periods beginning on 
July 14, 1979, and ending on July 31, 1982. Following the expiration of this coverage 
period, all of the events necessary to give rise to a claim or cause of action under the 
insurance policies issued by SAIC would have necessarily occurred and any liability on 
the part of SAIC would have attached by July 31, 1982. Indeed, CSX not only alleged 
that liability had attached, it filed lawsuits against SAIC on that basis. 
Even if the specific events giving rise to liability under the insurance policies may 
have been unknown by SAIC and CSX, or had yet to manifest themselves by the end of 
the coverage period, this still would not change the conclusion that CSX had existing 
claims against SAIC on July 31, 1982. It is well settled under Utah's Insurance Code that 
contingent, unmatured, and unliquidated obligations create claims under Utah's 
preference statute. The Utah Insurance Code's definition of "creditor" includes an 
insured having any claim against its insurer, whether the claims be matured, unmatured, 
liquidated, unliquidated, secured, unsecured, absolute, fixed, or contingent. Utah Code 
Annotated § 31-1-301(21) (1999)4. This definition dictates that even though the full 
extent of a claim may not be known until a future point in time, it is nevertheless an 
antecedent debt. 
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the contingent nature of CSX's 
covered insurance claims were deemed too "unknown" to be antecedent debts of SAIC at 
4
 This definition, which has not been amended other than to add subparagraphs, now 
appears at Utah Code Annotated § 31A-1-301(24) (1999). 
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the end of the coverage period in July of 1982, at the very least, the District Court should 
have found that CSX's claims and SAIC's corresponding debt arose at the very latest 
when the last complaint in the asbestos coverage litigation was filed against SAIC in 
January of 1990. For example, in In re Winkle, 128 B.R. 529, 536 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1991), the court held that allegations contained in a complaint which asserted a right to 
payment were sufficient to have constituted a claim. The court went on to state that 
"[t]he fact that such antecedent debt was not reduced to judgment prior to the transfer . . . 
[was], of course, irrelevant. It [was] sufficient that the claim was contingent or disputed." 
Id. 
In each of the asbestos coverage litigation complaints, CSX alleged that 
substantial premiums had been expended to purchase the liability policies from SAIC and 
that all applicable conditions precedent under the policies had been met. (R. 314-316, 
391, 404, 447.) Additionally, each of the asbestos coverage litigation complaints alleged 
that SAIC was obligated under the insurance policies to pay in full all sums to which the 
insured plaintiffs could become liable, through judgment, settlement, or otherwise. (R. 
314-316, 392, 405,449.) Accordingly, as a matter of law, SAIC's debts to CSX are 
deemed to have arisen no later than January 11, 1990, the date on which CSX filed the 
last of the three asbestos coverage complaints against SAIC. 
Further support for the Liquidator's position in this matter is found in the 
numerous bankruptcy decisions dealing with the concept of "antecedent debt." Although 
the Utah Insurance Code does not define the term "antecedent debt," several bankruptcy 
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courts have stated that a debt5 is antecedent if it is incurred before the transfer. See e.g. 
In re Ogden, 243 B.R. 104, 111-112 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) (an antecedent debt exists if the 
creditor had a claim against the debtor before the transfers in question or if the creditor 
would be able to assert a claim against the bankrupt's estate if the payment had not been 
made); In re Miniscribe Corp., 123 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991). 
In addition, the cases also make clear that claims, which arise in the future, 
constitute "antecedent" debts. For instance, in In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 832 F.2d 
997,1001 (7 Cir. 1987), the court held that when a creditor has a claim against a debtor, 
even if it is unliquidated, unfixed, or contingent, the debtor has still incurred a debt. See 
also In re Futoran, 76 F.3d 265, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1996) (husband's future spousal support 
obligations that were to be paid in the future constituted antecedent debts for preference 
purposes under the Bankruptcy Code); In re Olson, 66 B.R. 687 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) 
(father's future child support obligations that were to be paid in the future constituted 
antecedent debts for preference purposes under the Bankruptcy Code); In re Hudson 
Valley Quality Meats, Inc., 29 B.R. 67, 72 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982). 
2. CSX's Agreement to Release SAIC From Liability For All Claims 
Arising Under the Insurance Policy Was Not Contemporaneously 
Made In Exchange for the Payments CSX Received from SAIC. 
In addition, even assuming that the settlement agreement was somehow 
"contemporaneous" with SAIC's liabilities, the settlement payments themselves were not 
made contemporaneously with the settlement agreement. Thus, the District Court erred 
5
 The Tenth Circuit has stated "that a debt is incurred when a debtor first becomes legally 
obligated to pay . . . . " In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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as a matter of law. For example, in In re Barefoot, 952 F.2d 795 (4m Cir. 1991), wire 
transfers to a creditor sent on May 13, May 29, and June 3, 1987, that replaced a 
dishonored check received by the creditor on April 20, 1987, were deemed to not be 
contemporaneous exchanges, even though the creditor's release of collateral in exchange 
for the check, if it had been honored, might have been contemporaneous. "The exception 
for a contemporaneous exchange does not ordinarily apply to credit transactions, and the 
dishonor of a check inevitably creates an antecedent debt owed by the debtor which any 
subsequent payments to make good the check, no matter how quickly made, would be 
satisfying." Id at 800. 
Likewise, in In re Pan Trading Corporation, S.A.J25 B.R. 869 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1991), the court held that settlement payments that were not made at the time of the 
settlement agreement were not "contemporaneous." In that case, the debtor was sued by 
the New York City Housing Department on long-standing housing code violations. The 
parties settled their lawsuit, and the debtor made installment payments to the department. 
When the department was sued for a return of the payments as a preference, it argued that 
it accepted the payments as new value in exchange for its implicit agreement to refrain 
from suing the debtor. The court rejected this argument, concluding that "successive 
forbearances from continuing a lawsuit does not create new value." Id. at 876. The 
court also concluded that the settlement payments, which were paid between June 24 and 
July 10, 1987 (the consent order settling the lawsuit was signed by the parties on May 11, 
1987), were not contemporaneous payments: 
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The payments in the instant case bear none of the earmarks of a 
contemporaneous exchange. The parties to the litigation settled upon a 
penalty to cure violations and then they set forth a schedule for payment. 
There was no new consideration, no contemporaneous exchange for new 
value, only payment upon an antecedent debt to satisfy a fine on long-
standing violations. 
Id at 876-77. 
In the Ottawa Cartage case, the debtor settled with certain creditors (the trustees of 
a pension fund) who had sued the debtor in March of 1982, and the debtor agreed that it 
would sell certain assets and turn over the proceeds to the creditors. The creditors were 
paid on April 28, 1982. When the creditors were sued for a return of the proceeds as a 
preference, the creditors argued that they had given "new value" by their forbearance 
from pursuing their lawsuit, and that the new value was given in a "substantially 
contemporaneous exchange." The court rejected the argument that there was a 
contemporaneous exchange: 
At the outset, even taking [the creditors'] argument at face value, the 
"exchange" was not "substantially contemporaneous." [The creditors'] 
"forbearance" began at the latest in March 1982 when [the debtor] and [the 
creditors] signed the Agreement (Ex. E). [The debtor] made its promise of 
future payment then, and its payment was made nearly a month later. [The 
creditors] have presented no evidence the parties intended a 
contemporaneous exchange of new value for money, and the one-month 
hiatus between the forbearance and the payment indicates the transaction 
was not "in fact" substantially contemporaneous. 
In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc., 55 B.R. at 376. 
Likewise, the delay from the date on which CSX and SAIC first agreed to a 
settlement in August of 1991 and the actual payments which were made by three checks 
dated October 28, 1991, November 26, 1991 and January 2, 1992, also defeats the 
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argument that the transfers by SAIC constituted "contemporaneous" consideration for 
CSX's earlier agreement to settle. 
IV. FINALLY, CSX SHOULD NOT HAVE PREVAILED ON ITS NEW AND 
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSIDERATION DEFENSE BECAUSE IT 
FAILED TO OFFER ANY EVIDENCE THAT ALLOCATES ANY 
MONETARY VALUE TO THE FUTURE CLAIMS THAT WERE 
RELEASED 
Finally, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of CSX 
because CSX did not offer any evidence that allocated any monetary value to SAIC from 
a release of future claims or that distinguished between the consideration for a release of 
future claims and the release of past and present claims. As noted by the court in Aero-
Fastener, a creditor relying on the new value exception in the Bankruptcy Code "must 
show that the value given for the transfer of the debtor's property must actually and in 
real terms enhance the worth of the debtor's estate so as to offset the reduction in the 
estate that the transfer caused." In re Aero-Fastener, Inc., 177 B.R. at 138. In addition, a 
creditor relying on the new value exception must show "something of tangible economic 
value," id. at 137, as well as "a specific dollar valuation" of the new value received by the 
debtor, in order to qualify for the new value defense. This is critical because a new 
consideration defense is only intended to protect transfers "to the extent that the creditor 
can show that the value given to the creditor equals the value the debtor received. For 
instance, as explained in the bankruptcy context, if the debtor transfers $50,000 to the 
creditor in exchange for the release of a lien of $30,000, the difference of $20,000 is not 
protected from avoidance under the contemporaneous exchange exception." 5 Collier on 
Bankruptcy § 547.04[l][a] at p. 547-44 (15th Ed. 2001). 
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CSX's failure to offer any evidence showing a specific dollar valuation of the 
release of future claims as well as its failure to show that releeising future claims brought 
any tangible economic value to SAIC's estate are also a basis for rejecting CSX's defense 
of "new and contemporaneous consideration" as a matter of law. Indeed, if CSX's future 
claims "may never in fact actually arise," as alleged by CSX, then such claims would be 
illusory, and there would be no consideration for a release of such future claims. Thus, 
for this reason as well, the District Court erred. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment entered by the 
District Court in favor of CSX Corporation and remand the case so that partial summary 
judgment may be entered in favor of the Liquidator. 
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Exhibit A 
31A-27-321 INSURANCE CODE 346 
an insurer ordered to be rehabilitated or liquidated under this 
chapter, which is fraudulent under this section, may be 
avoided by the rehabilitator or liquidator, except for a person 
who in good faith is a purchaser, lienor, or obligee for a present 
fair consideration, and except tha t any purchaser, lienor, or 
obligee, who in good faith has given a consideration which is 
less than fair for such transfer, lien, or obligation, may retain 
the property, lien, or obligation as security for repayment. The 
court may, on due notice, order tha t any such transfer or 
obligation be preserved for the benefit of the estate, in which 
event the rehabilitator or liquidator on repayment succeeds to 
and may enforce the rights of the purchaser, lienor, or obligee. 
(2) (a) A transfer of property other than real property is 
considered to be made or allowed when it becomes so far 
perfected tha t no subsequent lien obtainable by legal or 
equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become 
superior to the rights of the transferee under Subsection 
31A-27-32K3). 
(b) A transfer of real property is considered to be made 
or allowed when it becomes so far perfected tha t no 
subsequent bona fide purchaser from the insurer could 
obtain rights superior to the rights of the transferee. 
(c) A transfer which creates an equitable lien is not 
considered to be perfected if there are available means by 
which a legal lien could be created. 
(d) For the purposes of this section, any transfer which 
is not perfected prior to the filing of a petition for reha-
bilitation or liquidation is considered to be made immedi-
ately before the filing of the successful petition. 
(e) Subsection (2) applies whether or not there are or 
were creditors who might have obtained any liens or 
persons who might have become bona fide purchasers. 
(f) For the purposes of Subsection (2), a transfer is not 
made until the insurer has acquired rights in the property 
transferred. 
(3) (a) A lien obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings 
upon a simple contract is one arising in the ordinary 
course of these proceedings upon the entry or docketing of 
a judgment or decree, or upon attachment, garnishment, 
execution, or similar process, whether before, upon, or 
after the judgment or decree and whether before or upon 
levy. It does not include liens which, under applicable law, 
are given a special priority over other liens which are 
prior in time. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (2), a lien obtainable by 
legal or equitable proceedings may become "superior to 
the rights of a transferee," or a purchaser may obtain 
"rights superior to the rights of a transferee,' ' if the 
superior rights follow only from the lien or purchase itself, 
or from the lien or purchase followed by any step wholly 
within the control of the respective lienholder or pur-
chaser, with or without the aid of ministerial action by 
public officials. A lien or purchase is not considered 
superior for purposes of Subsection (2) if the lien or 
purchase superiority can be obtained only through acts 
subsequent to the obtaining of the Hen or subsequent to 
the purchase which require the agreement or concurrence 
of any third party or which require any further judicial 
action or ruling. 
(4) Any transaction of the insurer with a reinsurer is 
considered fraudulent and may be avoided by the rehabilitator 
or liquidator under Subsection (1) if: 
(a) the transaction consists of the termination, adjust-
ment, or settlement of a reinsurance contract in which the 
reinsurer is released from any par t of its duty to pay the 
originally specified share of losses that had occurred prior 
to the time of the transaction, unless the reinsurer gives 
a present fair consideration for the release; and 
(b) any par t of the transaction took place within one 
year prior to the date of filing of the petition pursuant to 
which the rehabilitation or liquidation was commenced. 
(5) An action or proceeding under this section may not be 
commenced after the earlier of: 
(a) two years after the appointment of a rehabilitator 
under Section 31A-27-303 or a liquidator under Section 
31A-27-310; or 
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under 
Subsection 31A-27-306(2) or the liquidation is terminated 
under Section 31A-27-339. 1986 
31A-27-321. Voidable pre ferences and l iens. 
(1) (a) As used in this chapter, "preference" means a t rans-
fer of any of the property of an insurer to or for the benefit 
of a creditor, for or on account of an antecedent debt, made 
or allowed by the insurer within one year before the filing 
of a successful petition for rehabilitation or liquidation 
under this chapter, the effect of which transfer may 
enable the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his 
debt than another creditor of the same class would re-
ceive. If a liquidation order is entered while the insurer is 
already subject to a rehabilitation order, transfers other-
wise qualifying are considered to be preferences if they 
are made or allowed within one year before t he filing of 
the successful petition for rehabilitation or within two 
years before the filing of the successful petition for liqui-
dation, whichever t ime is shorter. 
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the rehabili tator 
or liquidator, if: 
(i) t he insurer was insolvent at the t ime of the 
transfer; 
(ii) the transfer was made within four months 
before the filing of the petition; 
(iii) the creditor receiving it or to be benefited by it 
or his agent acting with reference to the transfer had, 
a t the time when the transfer was made, reasonable 
cause to believe tha t the insurer was or was about to 
become insolvent; or 
(iv) the creditor receiving it was an officer, an 
employee, an attorney, or other person who was in 
fact in a position of comparable influence in the 
insurer to an officer, or any shareholder holding 
directly or indirectly more t h a n 5% of any class of 
equity security issued by the insurer, or any other 
person with whom the insurer did not deal at arm's 
length. 
(c) Where the preference is voidable, the rehabili tator 
or liquidator may recover the property or, if it has been 
converted, its value, from any person who has received or 
converted the property, except tha t he may not recover 
from a bona fide purchaser from or lienor of the debtor's 
transferee for a present fair consideration. Where a bona 
fide purchaser or lienor has given less than fair consider-
ation, the bona fide purchaser or lienor has a lien upon the 
property to the extent of the consideration actually given 
by him. Where a preference by way of lien or security title 
is voidable, the court may, on due notice, order the lien or 
title to be preserved for the benefit of the estate, in which 
event the lien or tit le passes to the liquidator. 
(d) Any payment to which Subsection 31A-5-415(2) 
applies is a preference and is voidable under Subsection 
(l)(b) if it is made within the t ime period specified in 
Subsection (l)(a), except that payments made by insurers 
for the purchase of insurance under Section 16-10a-302 
are not preferences. 
(2) Subsection 31A-27-320(2) applies to the perfection of 
transfers. 
(3) Subsection 31A-27-320(3) applies to Hens by legal or 
equitable proceedings. 
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(4) The receiver may not avoid a transfer of property under 
this section for or because of: 
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration; 
(b) the payment, within 45 days after a debt is in-
curred, of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of the 
business of the insurer and according to normal business 
terms; 
(c) a transfer of a security interest in property to enable 
the insurer to acquire the property and which is perfected 
within ten days after the security interest attaches; 
(d) a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor to the 
extent that after the transfer, the creditor gave new value 
not secured by an unavoidable security interest and on 
account of which the insurer did not make an unavoidable 
transfer to or for the benefit of the creditor; or 
(e) a transfer of a perfected security interest in inven-
tory or a receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the 
extent that the aggregate of all of those types of transfers 
to the transferee caused a reduction of the amount by 
which the debt secured by the security interest exceeded 
the value of the security interest four months prior to the 
date of liquidation or any time subsequent to the liquida-
tion. 
(5) The receiver may avoid a transfer of property of the 
insurer transferred to secure reimbursement of a surety that 
furnished a bond or other obligation to dissolve a judicial lien 
that would have been avoidable by the receiver under Subsec-
tion (l)(b). The liability of the surety under the bond or 
obligation shall be discharged to the extent of the value of the 
property recovered by the receiver or the amounts paid to the 
receiver. 
(6) The property affected by any lien which is considered 
voidable under Subsection (l)(b) and Subsection (5) is dis-
charged from the lien, and that property and any of the 
indemnifying property transferred to or for the benefit of a 
surety passes to the rehabilitator or liquidator, except that the 
court may, on due notice, order the lien to be preserved for the 
benefit of the estate and the court may direct that a convey-
ance be executed which is adequate to evidence the title of the 
rehabilitator or liquidator. 
(7) The court has jurisdiction of any proceeding by the 
rehabilitator or liquidator, to hear and determine the rights of 
any parties under this section. Reasonable notice of any 
hearing in the proceeding shall be given to all parties in 
interest, including the obligee of a releasing bond or other 
similar obligation. Where an order is entered for the recovery 
of indemnifying property in kind or for the avoidance of an 
indemnifying lien, the court, upon application of any party in 
interest, shall in the same proceeding ascertain the value of 
the property or lien, and if the value is less than the amount 
for which the property is indemnity or than the amount of the 
lien, the transferee or lienholder may elect to retain the 
property or lien upon payment of its value, as ascertained by 
the court, to the rehabilitator or liquidator within those 
reasonable times as fixed by the court. 
(8) The liability of a surety under a releasing bond or other 
similar obligation is discharged to the extent of the value of 
the indemnifying property recovered or the indemnifying lien 
nullified and avoided or, where the property is retained under 
Subsection (7) to the extent of the amount paid to the 
rehabilitator or liquidator. 
(9) If a creditor has been preferred and afterward in good 
faith gives the insurer further credit without security of any 
kind, for property which becomes a part of the insurer's estate, 
the amount of the new credit remaining unpaid at the time of 
the petition shall be setoff against the preference which would 
otherwise be recoverable from him. 
(10) If an insurer, directly or indirectly, within four months 
before the filing of a successful petition for rehabilitation or 
liquidation under this chapter or at any time in contemplation 
of a proceeding to rehabilitate or liquidate it, pays money or 
transfers property to an attorney at law for services rendered 
or to be rendered, the transaction may be examined by the 
court on its own motion or shall be examined by the court on 
petition of the rehabilitator or liquidator and shall be held 
valid only to the extent the transfer is a reasonable amount as 
determined by the court. The excess may be recovered by the 
rehabilitator or liquidator for the benefit of the estate. If the 
attorney meets the description in Subsection (l)(b)(iv), that 
subsection applies in place of this subsection. 
(11) (a) Every officer, manager, employee, shareholder, 
member, subscriber, attorney, or any other person acting 
on behalf of the insurer who knowingly participates in 
giving any preference when he has reasonable cause to 
believe the insurer is or is about to become insolvent at 
the time of the preference, is personally liable to the 
rehabilitator or liquidator for the amount of the prefer-
ence. It is permissible to infer that there is reasonable 
cause to so believe if the transfer was made within four 
months before the date of filing the successful petition for 
rehabilitation or liquidation. 
(b) Every person receiving any property from the in-
surer or for the benefit of the insurer as a preference 
which is voidable under Subsection (l)(b) is personally 
liable for that transfer and property and is bound to 
account to the rehabilitator or liquidator. 
(c) This subsection does not prejudice any other claim 
by the rehabilitator or liquidator against any person. 
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31A-27-322. Recoupment from affiliates. 
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conser-
vation of an insurer authorized to do business in this state is 
ordered under this chapter, the receiver appointed under the 
order has a right to recover on behalf of the insurer from any 
affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount of distribu-
tions, other than stock dividends paid by the insurer on its 
capital stock, made at any time during the five years preced-
ing the petition for liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. 
This recovery is subject to the limitations of Subsections (2) 
through (6). 
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that, 
when paid, the distribution was lawful and reasonable, and 
that the insurer did not know and could not reasonably have 
known that the distribution might adversely affect its sol-
vency. 
(3) The maximum amount recoverable under this section is 
the amount needed, in excess of all other available assets, to 
pay all claims under the receivership, reduced for each recipi-
ent by any amount the recipient has already paid to receivers 
under similar laws of other states. 
(4) Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the 
insurer at the time the distributions were paid is Hable up to 
the amount of distributions he received. Any person who was 
an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the time the distri-
butions were declared is liable up to the amount of distribu-
tions he would have received if they had been paid immedi-
ately. If two or more persons are liable regarding the same 
distributions, they are jointly and severally liable. 
(5) If any person liable under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all 
affiliates that controlled that person at the time the dividend 
was declared or paid are jointly and severally Hable for any 
resulting deficiency in the amount recovered from the insol-
vent affiHate. 
(6) This section does not enlarge the personal liability of a 
director under existing law. 
(7) An action or proceeding under this section may not be 
commenced after the earlier of: 
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(15) "Certificate of authority" is included within the 
term "license." 
(16) "Claim," unless the context otherwise requires, 
means a request or demand on an insurer for payment of 
benefits according to the terms of an insurance policy. 
(17) "Claims-made coverage" means an insurance con-
tract or provision limiting coverage under a policy insur-
ing against legal liability to claims that are first made 
against the insured while the policy is in force. 
(18) (a) "Commissioner" or "commissioner of insur-
ance" means Utah's insurance commissioner. 
(b) When appropriate, the terms listed in Subsec-
tion (18)(a) apply to the equivalent supervisory offi-
cial of another jurisdiction. 
(19) (a) "Control," "controlling," "controlled," or "under 
common control" means the direct or indirect posses-
sion of the power to direct or cause the direction of the 
management and policies of a person. This control 
may be: 
(i) by contract; 
(ii) by common management; 
(iii) through the ownership of voting securi-
ties; or 
(iv) by a means other than those described in 
Subsections (19)(a)(i) through (iii). 
(b) There is no presumption tha t an individual 
holding an official position with another person con-
trols that person solely by reason of the position. 
(c) A person having a contract or arrangement 
giving control is considered to have control despite 
the illegality or invalidity of the contract or arrange-
ment. 
(d) There is a rebuttable presumption of control in 
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, 
holds with the power to vote, or holds proxies to vote 
10% or more of the voting securities of another 
person. 
(20) (a) "Corporation" means insurance corporation, 
except when referring to: 
(i) a corporation doing business as an insur-
ance broker, consultant, or adjuster under: 
(A) Chapter 23, Insurance Marketing — 
Licensing Agents, Brokers, Consultants, and 
Reinsurance Intermediaries; and 
(B) Chapter 26, Insurance Adjusters; or 
(ii) a noninsurer tha t is par t of a holding 
company system under Chapter 16, Insurance 
Holding Companies. 
(b) "Stock corporation" means stock insurance cor-
poration. 
(c) "Mutual" or "mutual corporation" means a mu-
t u a l insurance corporation. 
(21) "Credit disability insurance" means insurance on a 
debtor to provide indemnity for payments coming due on 
a specific loan or other credit transaction while the debtor 
is disabled. 
(22) "Credit insurance" means surety insurance under 
which mortgagees and other creditors are indemnified 
against losses caused by the default of debtors. 
(23) "Credit life insurance" means insurance on the life 
of a debtor in connection with a loan or other credit 
transaction. 
(24) "Creditor" means a person, including an insured, 








(h) fixed; or 
(i) contingent. 
(25) (a) "Customer service representative" means a 
person that provides insurance services and insur-
ance product information: 
(i) for its agent, broker, or consultant em-
ployer; and 
(ii) to its employer's customer, client, or orga-
nization, 
(b) A customer service representative may only 
operate within the scope of authority of its agent, 
broker, or consultant employer. 
(26) "Deemer clause" means a provision under this title 
under which upon the occurrence of a condition precedent, 
the commissioner is deemed to have taken a specific 
action. If the statute so provides, the condition precedent 
may be the commissioner's failure to t ake a specific 
action. 
. (27) "Degree of relationship" means t he number of 
steps between two persons determined by counting the 
generations separating one person from a common ances-
tor and then counting the generations to the other person. 
(28) "Department" means the Insurance Department . 
(29) "Director" means a member of the board of direc-
tors of a corporation. 
(30) "Disability insurance" means insurance writ ten to: 
(a) indemnify for losses and expenses resulting 
from accident or sickness; 
(b) provide payments to replace income lost from 
accident or sickness; and 
(c) pay for services resulting directly from accident 
or sickness, including medical, surgical, hospital, and 
other ancillary expenses. 
(31) "Domestic insurer" means an insurer organized 
under the laws of this state. 
(32) "Domiciliary state" means the state in which an 
insurer: 
(a) is incorporated; 
(b) is organized; or 
(c) in the case of an alien insurer, enters into the 
United States. 
(33) "Employee benefits" means one or more benefits or 
services provided employees or their dependents. 
(34) (a) "Employee welfare fund" means a fund: 
(i) established or maintained, whether di-
rectly or through trustees, by: 
(A) one or more employers; 
(B) one or more labor organizations; or 
(C) a combination of employers and labor 
organisations*, and 
(ii) tha t provides employee benefits paid or 
contracted to be paid, other than income from 
investments of the fund, by or on behalf of an 
employer doing business in this s ta te or for the 
benefit of any person employed in this state, 
(b) "Employee welfare fund" includes a plan 
funded or subsidized by user fees or t ax revenues. 
(35) "Excludes" is not exhaustive and does not mean 
tha t other things are not also excluded. The items listed 
are representative examples for use in interpretation of 
this title. 
(36) "Fidelity insurance" means insurance guarantee-
ing the fidelity of persons holding positions of public or 
private trust . 
(37) "First party insurance" means an insurance policy 
or contract in which the insurer agrees to pay claims 
submitted to it by the insured for the insured's losses. 
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The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
CSX Corporations's ("CSX") Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment and for Partial Summary 
Judgment Against Defendant. The Court heard oral argument with 
respect to the motions on March 5, 2001. Following the hearing, 
the matters were taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, CSX argues the 
payments from Southern America Insurance Company ("SAIC") to CSX 
WILCOX v. CSX Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
are not avoidable because SAIC made the payments to CSX in exchange 
for new and contemporaneous consideration, which are not voidable 
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321.1 In this case, CSX contends it 
gave valuable consideration in exchange for the payments. 
Specifically, such consideration included: accepting payment in an 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4): 
The receiver may not avoid a transfer of 
property under this section for or because 
of: 
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration; 
(b) the payment, within 45 days after a debt 
is incurred, of a debt incurred in the 
ordinary course of the business of the 
insurer and according to normal business 
terms ; 
(c) a transfer of a security interest in 
property to enable the insurer to acquire the 
property and which is perfected within ten 
days after the security interest attaches; 
(d) a transfer to or for the benefit of a 
creditor to the extent that after the 
transfer, the creditor gave new value not 
secured by an unavoidable security interest 
and on account of which the insurer did not 
make an unavoidable transfer to or for the 
benefit of the creditor; or 
(e) a transfer of a perfected security 
interest in inventory or a receivable or the 
proceeds of either, except to the extent that 
the aggregate of all of those types of 
transfers to the transferee caused a 
reduction of the amount by which the debt 
secured by the security interest exceeded the 
value of the security interest four months 
prior to the date of liquidation or any time 
subsequent to the liquidation. 
(Emphasis added). 
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amount lower than that to which they were initially entitled, 
losing their right to obtain an enforceable judgment, appeal any 
errors occurring at trial, and the right to obtain a writ of 
execution on that judgment, and in so doing, CSX gave SAIC the 
significant benefit of resolving this claim, avoiding a judgment 
being entered against it, and saving the expense of litigation. 
Additionally, CSX argues the Liquidator may not avoid the 
payments because they were made within forty-five days after a debt 
was incurred, they were made for a debt incurred in the ordinary 
course of SAIC's insurance business, and because they were incurred 
according to normal business terms (arising via the settlement 
agreement) and are not transfers pursuant to an antecedent debt. 
Next, CSX contends summary judgment in favor of the Liquidator 
is not appropriate because he has failed to show that the payments 
were for an antecedent debt; it cannot be established as a matter 
of law that with these payments CSX would have received a greater 
benefit than similarly situated creditors, and there has been no 
determination that SAIC was insolvent. Finally, CSX argues there 
is no support for the Liquidator's assertion that prejudgment 
interest is appropriate and such an award would be contrary to Utah 
law. 
The Liquidator opposes the motion and brings its own motion 
for summary judgment arguing an element to establish a voidable 
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preference is thar one of the four requirements set forth in Utah 
Code Annotated § 31A-27-321 (1) (b) (1991) is present.2 With this 
motion, the Liquidator contends one of those elements, SAIC s 
insolvency, can be established. Indeed, it is the Liquidator's 
position the Affidavit of Paul N. Shields establishes that SAIC's 
qualified assets did not exceed its liabilities, plus minimum 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321 which addresses 
voidable preferences and liens: 
(1) (a) As used in this chapter, 
"preference" means a transfer of any of the 
property of an insurer to or for the benefit 
of a creditor, for or on account of an 
antecedent debt, made or allowed by the 
insurer within one year before the filing of 
a successful petition for rehabilitation or 
liquidation under this chapter, the effect of 
which transfer may enable the creditor to 
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than 
another creditor of the same class would 
receive. If a liquidation order is entered 
while the insurer is already subject to a 
rehabilitation order, transfers otherwise 
qualifying are considered to be preferences 
if they are made or allowed within one year 
before the filing of the successful petition 
for rehabilitation or within two years before 
the filing of the successful petition for 
liquidation, whichever time is shorter. 
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the 
rehabilitator or liquidator, if: 
(i) the insurer was insolvent at the time of 
the transfer; 
(ii) the transfer was made within four months 
before the filing of the petition . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
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required capital, plus 30% of the compulsory surplus required to be 
maintained by SAIC under the definition of "insolvency" in Utah 
Code Annotated § 31A-1-301(39). According to the Liquidator, the 
Shields Affidavit also establishes that no material improvement 
occurred in SAIC's financial condition between December 31, 1990 
and March 25, 1992, the date the Liquidation Order was filed with 
the Third Judicial District Court. Based upon the forgoing, the 
Liquidator argues the insolvency of SAIC, as defined in U.C.A. § 
31A-1-301(39) between March 25, 1991 and March 25, 1992, has been 
established and summary judgment on this element of a voidable 
preference in its favor is appropriate. 
Additionally, the Liquidator argues the Affidavit of Rheta 
Beach is sufficient to establish the class of claims into which 
CSX' s claim will fall and to establish that CSX will receive more 
than other similarly situated creditors. 
As to whether the payments to CSX were for an antecedent debt, 
the Liquidator contends the language of the insurance policies 
issued by SAIC provided coverage to CSX for three separate periods 
beginning on July 14, 1979 and ending on July 31, 1982. Following 
the expiration of these coverage periods, all of the events 
necessary to give rise to a claim or cause of action under those 
policies had occurred. According to the Liquidator, the October 
14, 1991 Settlement Letter did not create the basis for SAIC's 
WILCOX v. CSX Page 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
liability to CSX, rather, the events that occurred while these 
insurance policies were in effect created the basis for such 
liability. The October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter, asserts the 
Liquidator, only memorialized the agreement as to the terms of 
payment of that pre-existing debt. 
With respect to the first two payments, it is the Liquidator's 
position it need not establish that SAIC was insolvent because 
those payments were made within four months of the filing of SAIC's 
liquidation petition. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(b). 
Moreover, contends the Liquidator, CSX's argument that the 
Liquidator's preference action is barred by the ordinary course 
defense fails. Specifically, it is the Liquidator's position that 
the three payments by SAIC to CSX were made more than forty-five 
days after the debt to CSX was incurred. Indeed, Section I of the 
Settlement Letter states: 
In settlement of the Coverage Suits, the 
parties agree to the following payment 
provisions: 
1. Southern will pay CSX the sum of $308,000 
as follows: 
$102,667.00 on October 31, 1991 
$102,667.00 on November 31, 1991 
$102,667.00 on December 31, 1991 
This sum shall be in full satisfaction of any 
claims by CSX against the policies issued by 
Southern for any losses due to Asbestos 
Related Claims, past, present, or future, 
whether or not asserted in Coverage Suits. 
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Further, argues the Liquidator, as a matter of law, the debt 
arose during the coverage period of the insurance policies-they did 
not accrue on the dates the payments were scheduled to be paid 
under the Settlement Letter. Such a position, asserts the 
Liquidator, fails to take into account the fact that a later 
compromise of a claim does not affect the time when the debt first 
arises. Finally, it is the Liquidator's position CSX offers no 
evidence to support its argument that the debt to CSX was incurred 
in the ordinary course of business of SAIC and according to normal 
business terms within the insurance industry. According to the 
Liquidator, debts which are paid pursuant to a settlement agreement 
are inherently not normal. 
Lastly, as to prejudgment interest, the Liquidator contends 
the Court can rule as a matter of law that it is entitled to 
recovery of interest at the statutory rate of ten percent per annum 
on the transfers recovered from and after March 25, 1994 through 
the date judgment is rendered, and thereafter, at the statutorily 
mandated post-judgment rate of interest. Indeed, contends the 
Liquidator, under Utah law, such interest is necessary to make the 
prevailing party whole. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
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as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) . XNIn considering a 
summary judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in rhe 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 
Cinder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 634 (Utah Cu. App. 
1987) . 
As noted, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321, which deals 
with voidable preferences and liens: 
(1) (a) As used in this chapter, "preference" 
means a transfer of any of the property of an 
insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor, 
for or on account of an antecedent debt, made 
or allowed by the insurer within one year 
before the filing of a successful petition for 
rehabilitation or liquidation under this 
chapter, the effect of which transfer may 
enable the creditor to obtain a greater 
percentage of his debt than another creditor 
of the same class would receive. If a 
liquidation order is entered while the insurer 
is already subject to a rehabilitation order, 
transfers otherwise qualifying are considered 
to be preferences if they are made or allowed 
within one year before the filing of the 
successful petition for rehabilitation or 
within two years before the filing of the 
successful petition for liquidation, whichever 
time is shorter. 
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the 
rehabilitator or liquidator, if: 
(i) the insurer was insolvent at the time of 
the transfer; 
(ii) the transfer was made within four months 
before the filing of the petition; 
(Emphasis added). 
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This having been said, however, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321 (4) 
provides: 
The receiver may not avoid a transfer of 
property under this section for or because of: 
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration; 
(b) the payment, within 45 days after a debt 
is incurred, of a debt incurred in the 
ordinary course of the business of the insurer 
and according to normal business terms; 
In the instant case, it is undisputed the Settlement Agreement 
between SAIC and CSX released CSX's existing and future claims. 
This, in addition the consideration noted by CSX in their 
memorandum in support of their motion, leads to the conclusion the 
payments received by CSX were for new and contemporaneous 
consideration.3 Accordingly, as a matter of law, the Liquidator's 
ability to avoid the payments is foreclosed and summary judgment in 
favor of CSX is appropriate. 
Based upon the forgoing ruling, the Court does not reach the 
remaining issues. The Liquidator's motion is, consequently, 
denied. 
3Utah Courts have held that "consideration may be found 
whenever a promissor receives a benefit or where [a] promisee 
suffers a detriment, however slight, In re Estate of Beeslev, 883 
P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1994), and have long held that a release or 
settlement of an unliquidated or disputed claim provides 
sufficient consideration for a binding agreement. See Browning 
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc, 72 P.2d 1060, 1068 (Utah 1937). 
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ORDER GRANTING CSX 
CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENTAND 
DENYING THE LIQUIDATOR'S 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940902077 CV 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
CSX Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Liquidator's motions for 
summary judgment and partial summary judgment came before the Court for hearing on 
March 5, 2001. The Liquidator was represented by Brent D. Wride and Elaine A. Mdnson. 
CSX Corporation was represented by E. Scott Savage, Samuel O Gaufin, and Eric K. 
Schnibbe. Having considered oral arguments and all memoranda and evidence submitted by 
the parties on these motions, and having entered its Memorandum Decision of March 12, 
2001, and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that CSX Corporation's motion for judgment is granted, and 
that judgment be entered in favor of CSX Corporation and against the Liquidator on ail claims, 
with prejudice and on the merits. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Liquidator's motion for summary judgment and 
motion for partial summary judgment are denied. 
DATED this ^ day of ,2001. 
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Brent D. Wride 
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Attorneys for the Liquidator 
E. Scott Savage 
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